

flatEX=DEGIRO

Remuneration System

for Management Board Members



Table of Contents

Preamble.....	3
1 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN CHANGES OF THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM FOR THE MANAGEMENT BOARD	4
2 PRINCIPLES OF THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM	6
3 MAXIMUM REMUNERATION AND UPPER LIMIT ON VARIABLE PAY (CAP).....	6
4 COMPENSATION COMPONENTS AND RELATIVE SHARE ON TOTAL COMPENSATION	7
5 NON-PERFORMANCE-BASED FIXED COMPENSATION COMPONENTS	8
6 PERFORMANCE-BASED VARIABLE COMPENSATION COMPONENTS	8
6.1 Short-term variable compensation (STI)	8
6.2 Long-term variable compensation (LTI).....	11
6.3 Fallback option for the grant of Stock Options.....	16
7 EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENTS.....	18
8 MALUS AND CLAWBACK PROVISIONS FOR VARIABLE COMPENSATION	19
9 SHARE OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES	19
10 CREDITING COMPENSATION FROM A SECONDARY JOB	19
11 BENEFITS UPON ASSUMING AND TERMINATING MEMBERSHIP ON THE MANAGEMENT BOARD	20
12 OTHER MATERIAL PROVISIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.....	20
13 PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING, IMPLEMENTING, AND REVIEWING THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM.....	20
14 APPROPRIATENESS OF TOTAL TARGET COMPENSATION.....	21
15 TRANSPARENCY, DOCUMENTATION AND REMUNERATION REPORT	22
Table of Figures	23

Preamble

flatexDEGIRO SE (hereinafter “flatexDEGIRO” or the “Company”) operates one of Europe’s leading and fastest-growing online brokerage platforms, currently serving more than 3.5 million customers in 16 countries. The company holds approximately €90 billion in assets under management and processed more than 75 million securities transactions for its clients in 2025.

flatexDEGIRO’s clients have access to a wide range of asset classes on the world’s major stock exchanges, including stocks, ETFs, cryptocurrencies, mutual funds, exchange-traded products, and savings plans. Our goal is to be the leading European platform for wealth building. flatexDEGIRO develops and operates its own IT platforms, thereby covering the entire value chain.

flatexDEGIRO continued its profitable growth trajectory in fiscal year 2025. Revenue rose by approximately 17 % to around 560 million euros, while net income increased by approximately 44 % to around 160 million euros. Both figures are thus at or above the upper end of the company’s previous forecast. Over the course of 2025, flatexDEGIRO had already raised its original annual forecast twice.

For 2026, the Management Board anticipates further profitable growth: Revenue is expected to rise by 5 to 10 percent and consolidated net income by 5 to 15 percent. Further organic growth in the customer base is expected in all relevant markets for the flatex and DEGIRO brands.

In February 2025, targets for the coming years were also presented: By 2027, revenue is expected to rise by about

one-third compared to the 2024 fiscal year to approximately 650 million euros, and consolidated net income by about 75 % to approximately 200 million euros.

This ambitious goal requires the full commitment and passion of all employees, above all the strategic and dedicated leadership of the Management Board. The Supervisory Board proposes to the Annual General Meeting a Remuneration System for the members of the Management Board that aligns with this strategic objective while taking into account the statutory requirements under the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and the regulatory requirements of the German Banking Act (KWG) and the Institutional Compensation Regulation (InstitutsVergV), the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), as well as the expectations of investors and proxy advisors.

The Remuneration System for the Management Board of flatexDEGIRO is designed to meet the requirements for modern, competitive remuneration of Management Board members and complies with the principles of good corporate governance:

- High transparency and traceability
- Balanced selection of performance indicators
- Transparent weighting and calculation of individual compensation components
- Strong focus on corporate success and performance
- Consideration of long-term objectives
- Alignment with corporate strategy
- Inclusion of share price performance and increase in corporate value
- Appropriateness and customary practice in both horizontal and vertical terms

1 Overview of the main changes of the Remuneration System for the Management Board

The Remuneration System will apply retroactively from the start of the 2026 fiscal year to all members of the Management Board of flatexDEGIRO.

A comparative overview of the revised components of the remuneration system is provided in the following figure:

The Remuneration System for the Management Board of flatexDEGIRO was presented to the Annual General Meeting on June 2, 2025, and approved with an approval rate of 88.79 %, after the previously presented Remuneration System was not approved with an approval rate of 33.91 % at the Annual General Meeting on June 4, 2024. The Supervisory Board reviewed the Remuneration System for the Management Board again in the 2025 fiscal year in accordance with § 120a Sec. 3. The reviewed Remuneration System for the Management Board was discussed in an intensive exchange with investors regarding their expectations.

Following a comprehensive revision last year of the performance-based, short-term variable compensation component and the structure of other contractual provisions, the Supervisory Board has now made changes to the structure, determination, and presentation of the performance-based, long-term variable compensation component and has developed a new Performance Share Plan for this purpose. In response to investor demands for a stronger link between long-term variable compensation and relevant performance criteria, in addition to measuring the relative performance of the total shareholder return of flatexDEGIRO compared to the companies in the STOXX Europe 600 Financial Services and the companies in the STOXX Europe 600 Banks, ESG criteria have also been incorporated as performance criteria in the new Performance Share Plan. Furthermore, the Performance Share Awards issued under this plan are also subject to the consideration of risk-adjusting factors over the plan's total four-year term. This leads to a stronger alignment with the company's strategic goals and further promotes the alignment of the interests of shareholders and members of the Management Board. In addition, shareholding obligations, known as Share Ownership Guidelines, are being introduced.

Remuneration System for the members of the Management Board of flatexDEGIRO		
Remuneration System from 2025		Remuneration System from 2026
Non-performance-based remuneration elements		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual fixed salary Payout in twelve instalments 	Fixed salary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual fixed salary Payout in twelve instalments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Benefits in kind in the form of the provision of a company car and insurances (e.g. Group accident, life and disability insurance) 	Fringe benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Benefits in kind in the form of the provision of a company car and insurances (e.g. Group accident, life and disability insurance)
Performance-based remuneration elements		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Target bonus Performance period: 3 years (backwards measurement) Performance criteria (Target achievement 0% - 200%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall targets: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 50% - 60% financial performance criteria (revenue, consolidated result, other financial KPIs) 10% - 20% ESG criteria Divisional factor: 0,8 - 1,2 Individual targets: 20% - 40% 	Short-term Incentive (STI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Target bonus Performance period: 3 years (backwards measurement) Performance criteria (Target achievement 0% - 200%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall targets: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 50% - 60% financial performance criteria (revenue, consolidated result, other financial KPIs) 10% - 20% ESG criteria Divisional factor: 0,8 - 1,2 Individual targets: 20% - 40% Payout: in cash; provided that the overall target achievement exceeds 150%, the company may pay out the excess net amount net amount, in whole or part, in shares; if the company exercises this option, the shares must be held until the requirements of the Share Ownership Guideline are met.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Stock Option Plan Term: 6 years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Waiting period: 4 years (incl. 3 years reference period) Exercise period: 2 years Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in share price of at least 40% at any point within the reference period Risk-adjusting factors (capital resources, liquidity, leverage) Payout: in shares or cash 	Long-term Incentive (LTI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Performance Share Award Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 80% relative Total Shareholder Return compared with STOXX Europe 600 Financial Services and the STOXX Europe 600 Banks 20% ESG criteria Risk-adjusting factors (capital resources, liquidity, leverage) Term: 4 years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance period for relative TSR and ESG criteria: 3 years (forwards measurement) and a 1-year waiting period Performance period risk-adjusting factors: 4 years Payout: in shares or cash Condition: if STI target achievement is below 100%, the Supervisory Board may reduce the LTI grant value to up to 50% of the original target amount
Further contractual provisions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed maximum remuneration according to Section 87a AktG: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CEO: 7,500,000 € OBM: 5,500,000 € 	Maximum remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed maximum remuneration according to Section 87a AktG: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CEO: 7,500,000 € OBM: 5,500,000 €
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possibility of reduction (malus) in the event of a serious breach of duty or compliance violation and possibility of reduction (malus) or clawback of variable remuneration in the event of a correction of target achievement due to incorrect consolidated financial statements or incorrect quarterly statements to the Bundesbank (restatement) 	Malus and claw-back provisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possibility of reduction (malus) in the event of a serious breach of duty or compliance violation and possibility of reduction (malus) or clawback of variable remuneration in the event of a correction of target achievement due to incorrect consolidated financial statements or incorrect quarterly statements to the Bundesbank (restatement)
---	Change of Control clause	---
	Share Ownership Guideline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Obligation to hold shares Amount: 100% of the annual fixed salary Build-up period: 4 years

Figure 1 Remuneration System of Members of Management Board Members of flatexDEGIRO SE

2 Principles of the Remuneration System

The Remuneration System for members of the Management Board (“**Remuneration System**”) of flatexDEGIRO is designed to contribute to the advancement of the business strategy and the long-term development of the Company and its affiliates. This is achieved primarily through a transparent and clear incentive structure for Management Board remuneration.

The Remuneration System—specifically through the weighting of financial metrics, social and corporate responsibility metrics (ESG criteria, ESG = Environment, Social & Governance), risk-adjusting factors, and the uniform compensation structure for all Management Board roles—is intended to set the right incentive priorities. In particular, the aim is to ensure that the Management Board makes only decisions that promise sustainable business success, without focusing on short-term optimization of its compensation.

Under the Short-Term Incentive (STI), 60 % to 80 % of the targets are common goals (“overall goals”) and 20 % to 40 % are individual goals for the members of the Management Board. The overall targets are divided into financial targets (50 % to 60 %) and ESG criteria (10 % to 20 %) and are supplemented by an assessment of divisional contributions using a divisional factor.

In addition to the STI, the company’s long-term performance is incorporated into the Remuneration System through a multi-year variable compensation component (Long-Term Incentive – LTI) in the form of performance share awards.

At the same time, Management Board remuneration should be in line with market standards and competitive so that the company can attract and retain suitable Management Board members. Therefore, within the specified framework, the Remuneration System should give the Supervisory Board the flexibility to respond to a changing market and competitive environment. The incentive structure should be clear and understandable for shareholders and Management Board members, as well as for

employees, whose bonus system is aligned with the targets of Management Board remuneration in the sense of a consistent incentive structure.

This is intended to create comprehensible and sustainable incentives for dedicated and successful work in a dynamic business environment. The achievement or exceeding of short- and long-term performance criteria is appropriately rewarded without incentivizing the taking of unreasonable risks.

The Remuneration System is intended to remain in effect for several years and, during this period, contribute to achieving a sustainable increase in the enterprise value of flatexDEGIRO. The Remuneration System complies with the provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the German Banking Act (KWG), and the German Institutional Remuneration Regulation (InstitutsVergV). It takes into account the expectations of investors and proxy advisors and, as outlined below, complies with the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) as published on April 28, 2022.

3 Maximum remuneration and upper limit on variable pay (cap)

Pursuant to Section 87a (1), sentence 2, no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the Supervisory Board has set a maximum remuneration for the members of the Management Board, which limits the maximum payout of the remuneration allocated for a fiscal year, consisting of non-performance-related (fixed salary, fringe benefits) and performance-related (STI and LTI) components, for a given fiscal year.

Note: The maximum remuneration is neither the amount of remuneration targeted by the Supervisory Board nor the amount it necessarily considers appropriate. It must be clearly distinguished from the annual target remuneration. It merely sets an absolute upper limit (cap), for example, to avoid disproportionately high Management Board compensation in the event of an unexpectedly good fiscal year.

When determining this maximum compensation, the Supervisory Board differentiates between the Chairman of the Management Board and the ordinary members of the Management Board to the same extent as when determining the target compensation. For the Chairman of the Management Board, the maximum remuneration remains EUR 7,500,000, and for the ordinary members of the Management Board, EUR 5,500,000. The maximum remuneration limits the total remuneration consisting of fixed and variable remuneration components; this includes, in particular, payments from long-term variable remuneration (Performance Share Awards).

In addition to the maximum remuneration pursuant to Section 87a(1), sentence 2, no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the Supervisory Board has determined, in accordance with Section 25a(5), sentence 4 of the German Banking Act (KWG) and Section 6(1) of the InstitutsVergV, that performance-based variable compensation may not exceed twice the amount of non-performance-based fixed compensation (i.e., that an upper limit of 2:1 is set for variable compensation relative to fixed compensation). On June 13, 2023, the Annual General Meeting of flatexDEGIRO approved by a 91.5 % majority the proposal to increase the upper limit for the variable remuneration components of the members of the Management Board of flatexDEGIRO SE to 200 % of the fixed remuneration in accordance with Section 25a (5) sentence 5 of the German Banking Act (KWG). Compliance with the 2:1 cap is verified prior to the payment or fulfillment of the variable compensation. If the variable compensation would exceed this cap, it is reduced accordingly.

4 Compensation components and relative share on total compensation

The Remuneration System generally consists of fixed, non-performance-based components and variable, performance-based components.

- Non-performance-based compensation consists of a fixed salary and fringe benefits (namely insurance,

- childcare, and a company car). There is no company pension plan for members of the Management Board.
- In contrast, performance-based compensation is not fixed but is tied to the achievement of specific targets and is therefore variable. It consists of a short-term and a long-term variable compensation component, the STI and the LTI.

The Supervisory Board sets an annual total target compensation for each member of the Management Board within the framework specified by the Remuneration System, which consists of the fixed salary, fringe benefits, and the target amounts for the STI and the LTI, assuming 100 % target achievement. The non-performance-based compensation contributes approximately 40 % to 50 % to the target compensation, the performance-based STI approximately 15 % to 25 %, and the performance-based LTI approximately 30 % to 40%.

Performance-based variable compensation for members of the Management Board (STI and LTI) accounts for approximately 45 % to 65 % of total target compensation. By giving greater weight to the LTI than to the STI, the compensation structure is also geared toward the company's sustainable and long-term development. The following figure shows the relative share of each compensation component in the total target compensation, as well as the percentage ratio of fixed to variable compensation:




Figure 2 Remuneration structure

5 Non-performance-based fixed compensation components

Non-performance-based compensation consists of two components: a fixed salary and fringe benefits.

Fixed Salary:

The fixed salary is a fixed annual compensation amount based on the respective Management Board member's area of responsibility and experience, paid in twelve equal monthly installments, subject to statutory deductions, on the 15th of each month. If a member of the Management Board joins or leaves during the year, the fixed salary is granted on a pro rata basis.

Fringe benefits:

Other fixed components of compensation include contractually guaranteed fringe benefits such as contributions to insurance plans (e.g., group accident insurance, life and disability insurance), childcare, and the provision of a company car in accordance with the current company car policy, which may also be used for personal purposes.

6 Performance-based variable compensation components

Performance-based variable compensation consists of two components: STI and LTI:

6.1 Short-term variable compensation (STI)

In addition to the fixed compensation components, all members of the Management Board are entitled to an STI.

The amount of the STI is determined based on the individual target amount ("**STI Target Amount**"). The STI target amount is the amount to which a member of the Management Board is entitled if the STI performance criteria are met 100 %. Depending on the degree to which the targets are met, the STI payout can range from 0 % to 200 % of the STI target amount. In principle, the STI is paid out in cash in accordance with the degree to which the targets are met.

If the STI exceeds a target achievement of 150 %, the Company may pay out the excess net amount, in whole or in

part, in shares of flatexDEGIRO; if the Company exercises this option, the shares must be held until the requirements of the Share Ownership Guideline are met.

In general, the Supervisory Board will ensure that the targets set are appropriately challenging—ambitious yet achievable for the Management Board—so that they effectively serve as incentives. The STI target amount and the target values for the performance criteria defined in the Remuneration System are set by the Supervisory Board for each member of the Management Board for the respective fiscal year, at its reasonable discretion, in the first quarter of a fiscal year.

The STI incentivizes the contribution made during the fiscal year to the operational implementation of the corporate strategy, in particular the establishment and expansion of flatexDEGIRO as Europe’s leading online broker. Within the STI, both overall targets—supplemented by an assessment of departmental contributions using a divisional factor—and individual targets for the members of the Management Board are set.

Within the overall objectives, financial performance criteria are weighted at 50 %–60 % and are based on the Group’s operating performance. To adequately reflect this, revenue, consolidated net income, and an additional financial performance metric are defined as financial performance criteria. Revenue growth and Net Income growth compared to the previous year represent the most significant financial performance indicators for the Group’s operational financial performance. The Supervisory Board has defined adjusted operating expenses as an additional financial control metric for the 2026 fiscal year.

The target achievement curve for the financial targets can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3.

Achievement of the financial performance criteria is calculated over a three-year assessment period. In this calculation, the current year’s performance is weighted at 70 %, the previous year’s at 20 %, and the year before that at 10 %. In this respect, the achievement of the financial performance criteria depends on the achievement of the targets in the two preceding years.

Within the overall targets, ESG criteria are weighted between 10 % and 20 %. To reflect these performance




Figure 3 Target achievement curve financial targets

indicators in the STI, measurable sustainability criteria are established. For the 2026 fiscal year, the Supervisory Board established a Common Governance Goal with a weighting of 10%—the possibility of exceeding this target is not provided for.

The target achievement curve for ESG-criteria can be illustrated as shown in Figure 4




Figure 4 Target achievement curve ESG-criteria

In addition to individual goals and common goals, the Supervisory Board may also take into account, in a differentiated manner, the contributions made by the divisions headed by the members of the Management Board toward achieving the overall goals by applying a divisional factor. To this end, it may adjust the achievement of the overall goals by a factor of 0.8 to 1.2 based on a reasoned assessment of the contributions to achieving these goals as well as the contributions to cooperation within the Management Board. As a rule, the divisional factor is 1.0. The

maximum achievement of the overall goals, including the divisional factor, remains limited to 200 % in any case. The application of the divisional factor and the Supervisory Board's rationale for this are reported transparently in the Remuneration Report.

Furthermore, to account for individual targets for each Management Board member when defining the performance criteria for the STI, 20 % to 40 % of the STI's target achievement is measured based on individual targets. Individual targets may include both quantitative and qualitative performance criteria and are set by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the fiscal year based on the areas of responsibility of the Management Board members. At the end of a fiscal year, the Supervisory Board assesses target achievement based on the predefined criteria and publishes the results transparently in the Remuneration Report.

To ensure a multi-year perspective for the STI as well, to prevent performance criteria from being optimized in the

short term at the expense of long-term corporate development, and to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirement for a three-year assessment period for all performance criteria, the performance criteria are measured over a three-year period. To this end, the current fiscal year as well as the two preceding fiscal years are used to determine the achievement of the performance criteria. The current fiscal year is given the highest weighting.

The Supervisory Board determines the final weighting of the individual financial and individual performance criteria within the target categories within the individual weighting ranges listed below. The determined weightings are disclosed ex post in the compensation report.

The following figure shows the relative share of the overall targets and individual targets for short-term variable compensation in the annual total target compensation, as well as the percentage ratio of the performance criteria within the STI (refer to Figure 5).




Figure 5 Calculation of STI

After the end of the fiscal year or upon the closing of the annual financial statements, the Supervisory Board determines, based on the actual figures derived from the consolidated financial statements with respect to the key performance indicators and otherwise calculated separately, whether the performance criteria have been met, exceeded, or missed. In addition, the total amount of variable compensation is reviewed in accordance with

Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV. If the performance criteria are not fully met, the STI may also fall short of the target amount or be waived entirely. The target values and their achievement are disclosed ex post in the Remuneration Report. If the criteria pursuant to Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV are not met when viewed as a whole, the variable remuneration may also be reduced or waived entirely.

If a member of the Management Board joins during the fiscal year, the STI target amount is calculated and determined on a pro rata basis.

If a member of the Management Board leaves during a fiscal year as a so-called “Good Leaver,” the STI shall be granted on a pro rata temporis basis as of the due date specified in the employment contract, provided that the achievement of the relevant targets has been confirmed by the end of the fiscal year and the audit pursuant to Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV has been conducted. A member of the Management Board is considered a “Good Leaver” in particular if their appointment ends regularly due to the expiration of a fixed term or ends prematurely for a reason for which the member of the Management Board is not responsible. In individual cases, the Supervisory Board remains authorized to settle the existing STI claims of a member of the Management Board leaving during the fiscal year with a one-time payment in accordance with the internal severance pay guidelines (in this case, the Company will declare a deviation from Recommendation G.12 of the GCGC).

If the Management Board member leaves as a so-called “bad leaver,” all STI entitlements lapse. A Management Board member is considered a “bad leaver” if they resign from their position without a material reason attributable to the company or if their appointment ends prematurely for a material reason attributable to the Management Board member.

6.2 Long-term variable compensation (LTI)

The LTI is based on performance share awards to ensure the company’s long-term and sustainable development as well as the multi-year focus of variable compensation. The performance share awards are based on the following key terms and conditions:

6.2.1 Entitlement and allocation

Members of the Management Board are granted a certain number of Performance Share Awards each year, calculated based on the individual LTI target amount agreed upon in their employment contract. Performance Share Awards grant the right to receive shares of the Company in accordance with the Performance Share Plan, subject in particular to the expiration of the applicable performance periods and vesting periods.

The individual LTI target amount of a member of the Management Board is used to determine the allocation of the Performance Share Award. Members of the Management Board who join the company during the fiscal year may be granted a Performance Share Award for the first year of their appointment, which may be prorated on a pro-rata basis. If the STI target achievement for the fiscal year preceding the year of allocation of a new tranche of Per , or if the Common Goals applicable to all members of the Management Board for the preceding fiscal year have been significantly missed, the Supervisory Board has the option to reduce the individual LTI target amount by up to 50 % of the originally intended LTI target amount. The percentage reduction is at the reasonable discretion of the Supervisory Board.

The individual LTI amount determined in this manner for the grant of a performance share award is converted into performance share awards. To do so, the individual LTI amount is divided by the unweighted average of the closing prices of the Company's shares in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG (or a corresponding successor system) over the 20 trading days preceding the date of grant of the Performance Share Award. A Performance Share Award thus corresponds, on the grant date, to the value of one share of the Company assuming 100 % target achievement. As part of the performance measurement during the term of a Performance Share Award tranche, the scope of the subscription right to shares of the Company may increase or decrease in accordance with the target achievement value.

Shares from the Performance Share Awards may only be granted if, at the time of grant, the requirements set forth in Section 7 of the Institution Remuneration Regulation, as amended, are met, no conflicting order has been issued by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) or any other supervisory authority, and – as amended from time to time – are met, no conflicting order has been issued by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) or any other supervisory authority, and, furthermore, the thresholds for the risk-adjusting factors have not been breached at the time of allocation.

A schematic representation of a Performance Share Award tranche is as follows:




Figure 6 Schematic representation of a performance share award tranche

6.2.2 Performance criteria

The final number of shares resulting from a performance share award tranche depends on the achievement of two performance criteria: flatexDEGIRO's total shareholder return compared to the companies in the STOXX Europe 600 Financial Services index and the companies in the STOXX Europe Banks index (each weighted at 40 %) and the achievement of ESG criteria (total weighting of 20 %). The overall target achievement from the two performance criteria is calculated by adding the target achievement for

each performance criterion, taking into account the respective weighting, and can range from 0 % to 150 %. Ultimately, the overall target achievement may be adjusted downward due to a failure to meet predefined risk-adjusting factors. The final scope of the subscription right to shares of the Company, i.e., the final number of shares to be transferred (so-called Performance Shares), is calculated by multiplying the total target achievement determined in this manner by the allocated number of Performance Share Awards.

Performance criteria 1 – relative Total Shareholder Return

Relative Total Shareholder Return (“rTSR”) is defined as the ranking of flatexDEGIRO’s Total Shareholder Return performance compared to the Total Shareholder Return performance of companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 Financial Services index and compared to companies in the STOXX Europe Banks index. TSR performance refers to the shareholder return derived from the price performance of flatexDEGIRO’s stock or the companies included in the benchmark indices, plus the notional reinvested dividends over the three-year performance period. The relative TSR is calculated separately for both benchmark indices. The measurement of target achievement for the rTSR is determined in each case using the percentile ranking method. If flatexDEGIRO’s TSR percentile ranking is equal to the median (50th percentile), the target achievement for the relative TSR is 100%. If flatexDEGIRO’s TSR percentile ranking is at the 25th percentile, the target achievement is 50 %. Below the 25th percentile, the target achievement for the relative TSR is 0 %. If flatexDEGIRO’s TSR percentile ranking is at or above the 75th percentile, the relative TSR target achievement is 150 %. Values in between are determined by linear interpolation. The percentile ranking and thus the target achievement are determined at the end of the three-year performance period.

Performance criteria 2 – ESG-criteria

For each tranche of the Performance Share Award, the Supervisory Board will select in advance up to four measurable sustainability criteria derived from the sustainability strategy and define corresponding ambitious targets for the three-year performance period. Care will be taken to ensure that there is no duplication of targets defined for the STI.

Sustainability criteria applicable to a Performance Share Award tranche may include, in particular, the following criteria:

- CO2 intensity/climate protection
- External ESG ratings
- Diversity, equity, and inclusion
- Pay transparency/equal pay
- Employee satisfaction

- Customer satisfaction/Net Promoter Score
- Risk management/compliance/relevant training
- Cybersecurity/resilience
- etc.

In the event that the Company’s sustainability strategy changes in the future, the Supervisory Board is authorized to establish different measurable and quantifiable sustainability targets for future Performance Share Award tranches, which may be derived from the environmental, social, or governance areas.

The Supervisory Board decides on the specific targets and their calibration—including the establishment of lower thresholds, target values, and upper thresholds—for each new Performance Share Award tranche. If the specified target value for an ESG criterion is achieved, this results in a target achievement of 100 %. If the actual value achieved is at or below the lower limit, this results in a target achievement of 0 %. If the actual value achieved for the ESG criterion is at or above the upper limit, this results in a maximum target achievement of 150 %. If the actual values achieved fall between the respective target value and the lower limit or between the respective target value and the upper threshold, target achievement is generally determined by linear interpolation. The ESG targets set for each tranche of the Performance Share Award and their calibration are explained in detail by the Management Board and the Supervisory Board in the respective Remuneration Report.

For the first tranche of the Performance Share Award in 2026, the Supervisory Board established the following criteria: CO2 intensity (Scope 1+2), employee satisfaction, and the Net Promoter Score, as well as external ESG ratings relative to a peer group (ISS, MSCI).

Additional performance criteria – risk-adjusting factors

As additional performance criteria from the financial sector, so-called risk-adjusting factors are included in the calculation of target achievement for the Performance Share Award. Risk adjustment complies with regulatory requirements for compensation structures at financial institutions and prevents the potential risk of the Remuneration System creating unintended incentives to take disproportionately high risks.

The risk-adjusting factors are derived from flatexDEGIRO's ambitious Risk Appetite Statement (RAS), which is reviewed and approved annually by the Management Board and Supervisory Board. Additional thresholds are derived not only from the RAS but also from regulatory requirements and the requirements of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). The risk-adjusting factors represent key financial performance criteria that are considered when assessing the company's financial performance and stability. They consist of the following three metrics:

- **Own Funds: Total Capital Ratio (TCR)**
 - o Percentage ratio of capital (Tier 1 capital (Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), Additional Tier 1 (AT1)), Tier 2 capital) to risk-weighted assets (RWA)
- **Liquidity: Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)**
 - o Percentage ratio of highly liquid assets to total net cash outflows over a 30-day period
- **Debt: Leverage Ratio (LR)**
 - o Ratio of Tier 1 capital (CET1, AT1) to total risk exposure (sum of all assets and off-balance-sheet items)

The use of risk-adjusting factors at the group level, by its very design, provides a clear objective for the members of the Management Board and thus avoids incentives to take on disproportionately high risks.

If a risk-adjusting factor falls below the applicable thresholds (reference values: Group quarterly reporting to the Deutsche Bundesbank) even once during the four-year term, the cumulative entitlement to the number of performance shares determined based on target achievement is reduced in accordance with the percentages shown. All reductions apply cumulatively over the term, starting from the respective initial allocation. Two instances of a single factor falling below the threshold in two consecutive quarterly reports are considered a single instance and result in only one reduction. This allows for a six-month grace period for each factor. The thresholds are based on flatexDEGIRO's current RAS and thus also on the restructuring thresholds and regulatory requirements. The number of performance shares may be reduced to zero at most by the risk-adjusting factors. The matrix for the various thresholds of the risk-adjusting factors is currently structured as follows:

	Risk Appetite Statement Limit TCR+50bps	Below Regulatory Limit TCR	Shortfall TSCR (Total SREP Capital Requirements)
Own funds	Total Capital Ratio (TCR)	-10 %	-20 %
	cumulative	-10 %	-30 %
			-70 %
Liquidity	Risk Appetite Statement Limit 125 %	Below Regulatory Limit LCR	Shortfall LCR by more than 25 %
	Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)	-10 %	-20 %
	cumulative	-10 %	-30 %
			-70 %
Debt	Risk Appetite Statement Limit ≤ 3,25	Below Regulatory Limit LR	Shortfall LR by more than 0,25 %
	Leverage Ratio (LR, incl. P2R/G-LR)	-10 %	-20 %
	cumulative	-10 %	-30 %
			-70 %

Figure 7 Risk-adjusting factors for Performance Share Awards

6.2.3 Term

The right to receive shares in the Company arises at the end of a total term of four years. This period begins on the date of allocation of the respective Performance Share Award tranche. The four-year term consists of a three-year performance period followed by a one-year vesting period.

Upon expiration of the four-year term, the Company shall make the final number of shares of a Performance Share Award tranche available immediately (subject to review of the total amount of variable compensation pursuant to Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV), but preferably within 20 trading days. Subject to the right to cash settlement, the Performance Share Awards are settled with shares of flatexDEGIRO; alternatively, the Company may also grant a cash settlement for some or all of the Performance Share Awards, corresponding to the market value of the Company's shares.

6.2.4 Limitation to number of shares to be granted

To ensure appropriate compensation, the claims arising from the value of the shares made available through the LTI are capped by setting a maximum compensation amount in accordance with Section 87a(1), sentence 2, no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). This ensures that payments from long-term variable compensation do not exceed a reasonable level, even in the event of exceptional performance.

6.2.5 Reduction or Cancellation of a Performance Share Award Tranche in the Event of Negative Performance Contributions

In the event of predefined negative performance contributions, flatexDEGIRO may, at its reasonable discretion and to the extent permitted by law, reduce all or part of the allocated performance share awards to zero or reduce them to a lower amount until the expiration of the applicable term. The scope of such measures by flatexDEGIRO is determined at its reasonable discretion, taking into account all circumstances of the individual case, such as the severity of the negative performance contribution, the resulting economic and reputational consequences for

flatexDEGIRO, and the degree of responsibility and involvement of the eligible person.

The defined cases for considering negative performance contributions include, for example, but are not limited to: the direct or indirect causation of a specific risk event, the official determination of a lack of professional competence, loss-causing actions in the form of fraud or gross negligence, intentional or grossly negligent misconduct, a significant decline in financial performance or the failure of risk management, as well as the necessity of a significant increase in the regulatory capital base.

A reduction of a Performance Share Award tranche due to a failure to meet the risk-adjusting factors remains unaffected by this.

6.2.6 Termination or suspension of employment

In the event of termination of the employment relationship between the beneficiary and flatexDEGIRO during the term, the performance share awards granted to the beneficiary and the resulting entitlements generally remain in full force (subject to a "good leaver" scenario) once the first year of the term has elapsed. In the event of termination of employment within the first year of the term, the portion of the Performance Share Awards that remains shall be calculated based on the exact number of months of service during the first year of the term of the respective Performance Share Award tranche. The final number of Company shares to be transferred under each Performance Share Award is determined upon expiration of the four-year term, subject to the fulfillment of the risk-adjusting factors. If the employment relationship ends due to the death of the beneficiary, the Performance Shares calculated on a pro-rata basis are transferred to the surviving dependents.

The Performance Share Awards allocated to the beneficiary shall expire with immediate effect without compensation or indemnification if the employment relationship and/or the beneficiary's appointment terminates prematurely for good cause attributable to the beneficiary pursuant to Section 626(1) of the German Civil Code ("Bad Leaver").

6.3 Fallback option for the grant of Stock Options

The long-term variable compensation component described in Section 6.2 is intended to apply provided that the Remuneration System is approved and the authorizations and/or capital measures necessary for the implementation of the Performance Share Plan are effectively adopted. Should this not be the case, the Supervisory Board has the option of alternatively granting stock options to the members of the Management Board under the existing long-term variable compensation model. The stock option program is based on the following key terms and conditions:

6.3.1 Entitlement and Allocation

Each year, members of the Management Board are granted a number of stock options calculated based on an individual target amount. The number of stock options granted is calculated by dividing the target amount by the fair value of a stock option on the grant date.

Stock options may only be granted if, at the time of grant, the requirements under Section 7 of the Institutional Remuneration Regulation, as amended, are met, no conflicting decision has been issued by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) or any other supervisory authority, and, furthermore, the thresholds for the risk-adjusting factors pursuant to Section 6.3.4 below have not been breached as of the date of grant.

Subject to the provisions below, each stock option grants the holder the conditional right to subscribe for one registered no-par-value share of flatexDEGIRO with a notional share of the share capital of EUR 1.00 (subscription shares) in exchange for payment of the subscription price.

The subscription price (issue price within the meaning of Section 193 (2) no. 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)) for one registered no-par-value share of flatexDEGIRO with a notional share of the share capital of EUR 1.00 corresponds to the non-volume-weighted average of the closing prices of the Company's shares in XETRA trading (or a comparable successor system) on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange during the last 30 trading days prior to the respective allocation, but in any case at least to the minimum issue price within the meaning of Section 9 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

6.3.2 Term

The stock option may be exercised no earlier than after the expiration of a vesting period of four years from the grant date ("**Waiting Period**"). After the waiting period has expired, the stock options may be exercised at any time until the end of the two-year exercise period ("**Exercise Period**"), subject to a review of the total amount of variable compensation in accordance with Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV – Exceptions to this include statutory provisions, regulatory requirements, and/or internal guidelines of flatexDEGIRO (exercise periods pursuant to Section 193 (2) no. 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)). Exercise is not permitted during the following blackout periods:

- four weeks prior to the legally or regulatory-mandated publication of financial figures on the dates specified in the financial calendar;
- four weeks prior to the publication of the notice convening a general meeting, up to and including the day the general meeting concludes.

A schematic representation of the stock option plan can be presented as follows:




Figure 8 Schematic representation of the stock option plan

6.3.3 Performance criteria Stock Price

In addition to the inherent exercise condition for the stock options—namely, that the stock price must be above the grant price at the time of exercise for the stock options to have value—subscription rights may only be exercised if the price of the flatxDEGIRO share has risen by at least 40 % on any trading day within the period from the grant date of the stock options until the expiration of three years after the grant date (“reference period”). The Supervisory Board reviews the target level of the required share price increase prior to each LTI grant and adjusts it as necessary. In particular, the target level may be adjusted in the event of a positive share price performance.

To determine whether the performance criterion has been met, the following are decisive: on the one hand, the closing price of the flatxDEGIRO share in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG (or its successor system) on the grant date of the respective stock option (“reference price”) and, on the other hand, a closing price of the flatxDEGIRO share in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG (or its successor system) that is at least 40 % above the reference

price during the reference period. Subscription rights and the corresponding stock options that have not met the performance criterion during the reference period expire without compensation or other indemnification.

6.3.4 Risk-adjusting factors

As in section 6.2.2 sub-section “Additional performance criteria – risk-adjusting factors”.

6.3.5 Option for cash settlement

flatxDEGIRO is entitled, in fulfillment of some or all subscription rights, to grant the holders, at its discretion, the difference between the subscription price and the relevant market value of the flatxDEGIRO SE share in cash (cash settlement) instead of shares. The beneficiaries are obligated to accept this cash settlement in fulfillment of their subscription rights. Under certain conditions, a member of the Management Board may be entitled to cash settlement in the event of a significant change in the Company’s shareholder structure.

6.3.6 Cap on Stock Options

To ensure appropriate compensation, the proceeds from the exercise of the LTI are capped by setting a maximum compensation amount in accordance with Section 87a(1), Sentence 2, No. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). This ensures that payments from long-term variable compensation do not exceed a reasonable level, even in the event of exceptional performance.

6.3.7 Reduction or Cancellation of Subscription Rights and Consideration of negative contributions to earnings

Notwithstanding the provisions established for stock options within the LTI and regardless of whether the performance criteria and exercise conditions attached to a stock option have been or are being met, flatexDEGIRO may, in the event of predefined negative performance contributions, at its reasonable discretion and to the extent permitted by law, reduce or cancel all or part of the subscription rights at any time prior to the date of their exercise, or make the exercise of a subscription right subject to additional conditions. The scope of such measures taken by flatexDEGIRO (e.g., a reduction of subscription rights) is determined at its reasonable discretion, taking into account all circumstances of the individual case, such as the severity of the negative performance contribution, the resulting economic and reputational consequences for flatexDEGIRO, and the degree of responsibility and involvement of the eligible person.

The defined cases for taking negative profit contributions into account include, for example, but are not limited to: the direct or indirect causation of a risk event, the determination of a lack of professional competence, loss-causing actions in the form of fraud or gross negligence, intentional or grossly negligent misconduct, a significant decline in financial performance or the failure of risk management, as well as the necessity -necessity of a significant increase in the regulatory capital base.

6.3.8 Termination or Suspension of Employment

As in section 6.2.6.

7 Extraordinary Developments

The criteria for calculating performance-based compensation and the performance criteria established by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the fiscal year are not changed during the course of the fiscal year. Any subsequent change to the target values or the comparison parameters is prohibited, with the exception of the cases described below. To meet the requirements of the GCGC pursuant to G.11, sentence 1, the Supervisory Board may, in justified and rare exceptional cases, appropriately take into account extraordinary developments whose effects are not sufficiently reflected in the achievement of targets when setting targets for the STI. This may result in either an increase or a decrease in the STI payout amount. The adjustment shall not exceed 20 %.

Examples of extraordinary developments during the year include, for instance, extraordinary changes in the economic situation (e.g., due to economic crises or health crises affecting the global economy) that render the original corporate targets obsolete, provided such changes were unforeseeable. Generally unfavorable market developments are not considered extraordinary developments during the year. Should extraordinary developments occur that necessitate an adjustment, the Supervisory Board will report on this in detail and transparently in the Remuneration Report.

8 Malus and clawback provisions for variable compensation

In the scenarios described below, the Supervisory Board may reduce or reclaim all or part of the variable compensation of Management Board members:

- In the event of negative performance contributions, and in particular in the event of a serious breach of duty or compliance, the Supervisory Board may, at its discretion, reduce the STI to zero. Depending on the severity of the breach, the Supervisory Board may, at its discretion, cancel all or part of the LTI's performance share awards without compensation.
- The Company has a claim against a member of the Management Board for the repayment of part or all of the performance-based compensation paid if, after payment of the performance-based compensation, it should become apparent that the audited and approved consolidated financial statements or a quarterly report to the Deutsche Bundesbank underlying the entitlement to the performance-based compensation were objectively incorrect with respect to compliance with the thresholds of the risk-adjusting factors was objectively incorrect and must therefore be corrected retrospectively, and based on the corrected audited consolidated financial statements or the corrected quarterly report, no entitlement to the performance-based remuneration would have arisen, or a lower entitlement would have arisen. Fault on the part of the Management Board member with respect to the necessity of correcting the consolidated financial statements or the quarterly report is not required. The claim for repayment becomes due upon the correction of the annual financial statements or the quarterly report. It remains valid even if the mandate and/or the employment relationship with the member of the management Board has already ended at the time the claim for repayment becomes due. The claim for repayment of shares from a Performance Share Award is excluded if more than two years have elapsed since the payment was made. The claim for repayment amounts to the difference between the performance-

based compensation paid out and the performance-based compensation that would have had to be paid out based on the corrected, audited consolidated financial statements or the corrected quarterly report. A subsequent correction of the consolidated financial statements or the quarterly report shall in no case result in an increase in the claim to performance-based compensation.

9 Share Ownership Guidelines

To better align the interests of the members of the Management Board with those of the shareholders, shareholding requirements will be introduced in the future. These require members of the Management Board to hold a significant amount of flatexDEGIRO shares for the duration of their appointment. For members of the Management Board, this requirement amounts to 100 % of their annual gross base compensation. The required share volume must be built up within 4 years. To comply with the shareholding requirements, in addition to newly acquired shares, shares acquired through the exercise of existing stock options from the SOP 2024, and shares transferred at the end of the term due to the allocation of Performance Share Awards, privately held shares as well as shares paid out in connection with STI overachievement (STI target achievement greater than 150 %).

10 Crediting compensation from a secondary job

Remuneration for any internal Group supervisory board positions or other concurrent positions is offset against the Management Board's compensation. If a member of the Management Board wishes to accept a supervisory board mandate outside the Group, the Supervisory Board shall decide, as part of the required approval process, whether the external remuneration shall be offset against the Management Board remuneration. In doing so, the Supervisory Board shall base its decision in particular on the

anticipated time commitment required for the supervisory board mandate outside the Group.

11 Benefits upon assuming and terminating membership on the Management Board

Upon assuming office, the Supervisory Board may grant a signing bonus, to compensate for the loss of benefits from the previous employer due to the change in employment. The amount of the signing bonus must be specified in an individual contract prior to the commencement of duties and is generally subject to the requirements of the InstitutsVergV.

Payments to a member of the Management Board in the event of early termination of the employment contract without good cause for the termination of the Management Board position are limited to a maximum of two years' compensation and shall not exceed the compensation for the remaining term of the employment contract (severance pay cap). In the event of premature termination of the Management Board member's duties due to good cause for termination by the Company, no severance payment is granted. The determination and payment of any severance pay are made in accordance with the internal severance pay policy and legal and regulatory requirements, in particular the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) and the provisions of the German Regulation on Remuneration of Management Board Members (InstitutsVergV), such as the review pursuant to Section 7 of the InstitutsVer.

12 Other material provisions in the employment contract

In accordance with the recommendation of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), the Supervisory

Board has the option to take exceptional circumstances into account within reasonable limits.

The employment contracts of Management Board members shall generally not exceed a term of three years upon initial appointment. Ordinary termination of the employment contract is excluded for both parties. The right to terminate for cause pursuant to Section 626(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) remains unaffected. In the event of early termination of the mandate, the employment contract also automatically terminates (linkage clause).

13 Procedures for establishing, implementing, and reviewing the Remuneration System

The Remuneration System and the structure of Management Board compensation are determined by the Supervisory Board and regularly reviewed for appropriateness. In doing so, the Supervisory Board may seek advice from parties independent of the Management Board and the company. In accordance with Section 12 of the InstitutsVergV, the Remuneration System and the underlying compensation parameters are reviewed once a year for their appropriateness, in particular their compatibility with the business and risk strategies.

Furthermore, it is ensured that, in accordance with Section 7 of the InstitutsVergV, the total amount of variable remuneration is determined taking into account risk-bearing capacity, capital planning, and the earnings situation.

The Remuneration System adopted by the Supervisory Board is submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval in accordance with the statutory requirements (Section 120a (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)). In the event that the Annual General Meeting does not approve the Remuneration System, the Supervisory Board must submit a revised Remuneration System for approval no later than at the next Annual General Meeting in

accordance with Section 120a(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

In accordance with Section 120a(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the Supervisory Board shall resubmit the Remuneration System for the members of the Management Board to the Annual General Meeting of flatexDEGIRO for approval whenever there is a material change to the Remuneration System, and at least every four years.

In his report to the Annual General Meeting, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board shall provide information on any conflicts of interest that have arisen and how they were handled. Should a conflict of interest arise involving a member of the Supervisory Board, that member shall abstain from any deliberations and resolutions regarding Management Board compensation.

The Supervisory Board determines the specific total target compensation for individual members of the Management Board based on the Remuneration System submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval. The total target compensation is commensurate with the duties and performance of the Management Board member as well as the company's financial situation and will not exceed customary compensation without good cause.

At the end of each fiscal year, generally shortly after the adoption of the financial statements, the Supervisory Board will assess the achievement of the respective targets and determine the specific compensation for each member of the Management Board. The achievement of these targets will be disclosed ex post in the compensation report, thereby making both the rationale and the amount transparent.

The Supervisory Board has the option, under special and exceptional circumstances pursuant to Section 87a (2) sentence 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), to temporarily deviate from the proposed Remuneration System if this is necessary in the interest of the long-term well-being of flatexDEGIRO. This applies in particular to extraordinary, unforeseeable developments that were beyond the control of the Management Board or flatexDEGIRO. Such deviations may, for example, be necessary to ensure adequate incentives in the event of a severe corporate or

economic crisis. Generally unfavorable market developments, however, do not justify a temporary deviation from the Remuneration System. A temporary deviation from the Remuneration System is only possible by resolution of the Supervisory Board.

In such cases, temporary deviations from the components of the Remuneration System are permitted: the financial and non-financial performance criteria for short-term and long-term variable compensation, as well as their weighting, the ranges of possible target achievement, and the methods for determining target achievement. Notwithstanding any deviation from the Remuneration System, the compensation of the members of the Management Board must continue to be geared toward the long-term and sustainable development of the company and ensure an appropriate level of incentive in the Management Board's compensation.

In addition, the Supervisory Board may temporarily grant additional compensation components or replace individual compensation components with other compensation components to the extent necessary to restore an appropriate incentive level for Management Board compensation.

Any deviations made are transparently disclosed and explained in the Remuneration Report.

14 Appropriateness of Total Target Compensation

In determining the total target compensation for individual members of the Management Board, the Supervisory Board ensures that it is commensurate with the duties and performance of the Management Board members as well as with the company's financial situation, and that it does not exceed customary levels.

- For the so-called “peer group comparison” (horizontal assessment of the appropriateness of Management Board compensation) of the total target compensation, the Supervisory Board refers, among other things, to

listed peer companies in Germany that allow for an objective comparison with regard to flatexDEGIRO's market position (in particular industry and size).

- For the appropriateness comparison within the flatexDEGIRO Group (vertical assessment of the appropriateness of Management Board compensation), the Supervisory Board considers, in particular, the compensation of senior management, but also that of the workforce as a whole.

15 Transparency, Documentation and Remuneration Report

Following the presentation of the Remuneration System to the Annual General Meeting, in accordance with Section 120a(2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the resolution of the Annual General Meeting and the Remuneration System shall be published immediately on the company's website and kept publicly accessible there free of charge for the duration of the Remuneration System's validity, but for at least ten years. A review of the Remuneration System (in particular pursuant to Section 12 of the InstitutsVergV) is conducted annually. In addition, the Management Board and Supervisory Board of flatexDEGIRO prepare an annual clear and comprehensible report on the remuneration granted and owed by the company and its affiliated companies to each individual current or former member of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board during the last fiscal year ("Remuneration Report"). The Remuneration Report, which must be audited by the auditor, will contain detailed information on the individual remuneration of each member of the governing bodies as well as on the development of Management Board remuneration in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The Company's Annual General Meeting shall then resolve, pursuant to Section 120a(4) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), on the approval of the Remuneration Report prepared and audited in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) for the preceding fiscal year

Table of Figures

Figure 1 Remuneration System of Members of Management Board Members of flatexDEGIRO SE.....	5
Figure 2 Remuneration structure.....	8
Figure 3 Target achievement curve financial targets.....	9
Figure 4 Target achievement curve ESG-criteria.....	9
Figure 5 Calculation of STI.....	10
Figure 6 Schematic representation of a performance share award tranche.....	12
Figure 7 Risk-adjusting factors for Performance Share Awards.....	14
Figure 8 Schematic representation of the stock option plan.....	17